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make a career choice to become either managers or workers.  Managers set up firms, post 
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jointly determined.  Higher start-up costs reduce overall employment but increase the size of 
incumbent firms.  I discuss some cross-country OECD evidence which supports the model’s 
main proposition. 
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This paper is a contribution to the literature that explains cross-country
diﬀerences in employment or unemployment rates in terms of structural mod-
els of the economy. Edmund Phelps contributed to this literature with his
important book Structural Slumps.1 My focus in this paper is on a factor
1Earlier seminal contributions include Bruno and Sachs’ (1985) Economics of World-
wide Stagflation and Layard, Nickell and Jackman’s (1991) Unemployment:Macroeconomic
Performance of the Labour Market. For a more recent contribution see Blanchard (1999)
and Blanchard and Wolfers (2000).
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that has been neglected in previous studies, the regulation of new company
start-ups.
With the increasing inter-dependence of the world’s industrial economies,
the diﬀerences in the performance of labor markets are more likely the out-
come of diﬀerent institutional structures than of diﬀerent experiences with
macroeconomic or policy shocks. Recent evidence has revealed large diﬀer-
ences in the regulatory environment for company start-ups across countries,
even within the OECD.2 The important quantifiable variables in this frame-
work are currently policy related: the legal rules and regulations that a new
entrepreneur has to comply with before starting his or her new company.
But other factors, for example those related to the availability of finance and
the stigma attached to bankruptcy, are also important ingredients of this
institutional structure.
Company start-up costs influence overall employment patterns through
the birth (and perhaps death) of new firms, so a pre-requisite for their im-
portance is that company births should account for a nontrivial fraction of
total net job creation. Although there is controversy about the precise role
of small firms in the job generation process, a consensus view is emerging
that over the last thirty years small firms have become more important job
creators than used to be the case. This change is partly due to the shift from
manufacturing to services, where there is higher concentration of small firms,
but other factors may be present too. It has even been claimed that most of
the gap in net job creation between Europe and the Unites States is in the
small business sector (OECD, 1987). Moreover, most net job creation in the
small business sector is done by new entrants, rather then by expansions of
existing firms.3 Thus, the channels through which start-up costs can influ-
ence aggregate performance appears well established in the labor markets of
Europe and North America.
Although I discuss some preliminary empirical work with aggregate OECD
data, my primary objective in this paper is to discuss the theory underlying
the connection between start-up costs and employment performance. De-
tailed empirical testing is postponed to future work. I will strip the model
of many important elements that careful empirical study has to take into
account, in order to focus on the key links between start-up costs and em-
2For preliminary results with OECD data see Fonseca et al. (2001). For a diﬀerent
and more comprehensive set of data, covering 75 countries, see Djankov et al. (2000).
3See the special issue of Business Economics, July 1994, for extensive discussion of the
role of small firms in the US economy.
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ployment. The model that I use builds on another seminal contribution of
Phelps’s, search equilibrium, but uses the more recent framework developed
in my book (Pissarides, 2000) and the ideas about entrepreneurship used by
Lucas (1978) in his “span-of-control” model.
In order to find a role for start-up costs in the determination of employ-
ment I need a precise definition of the firm and the incentives that entre-
preneurs have for creating firms. I define a firm as a collection of jobs, each
one occupied by a worker or vacant, and managed by an entrepreneur. The
entrepreneur is both the owner and the manager of the firm. The overall cost
of managing a firm depends on the number of jobs managed and on a pa-
rameter which is specific to the manager, and which summarizes the agent’s
“managerial skill” or “entrepreneurship”. Agents choose whether to become
entrepreneurs or workers by maximizing expected lifetime income. I show
that the choice of career is determined by a cut-oﬀ managerial ability, with
more able managers choosing to set up their own firms and create jobs. Em-
ployment is determined by an aggregate matching function which matches
the posted jobs with the agents who choose to become workers.
In contrast to Lucas’s (1978) model, managerial skill in my model does
not influence the firm’s total factor productivity. More able managers in my
model spend fewer resources on managing their firm but produce the same
output for each job that they own as less able managers. This property
enables the derivation of a conventional search and matching equilibrium
conditional on the numbers of managers and workers. I do not consider the
role of capital and savings, although their introduction should not be diﬃcult,
given existing results in search theory.
Section 1 describes the theoretical framework and the key assumption
about managers and workers. Section 2 derives the decentralized search equi-
librium without start-up costs. Section 3 introduces three diﬀerent kinds of
start-up costs and studies their role in the determination of employment.
Section 4 presents some preliminary evidence from 17 OECD countries sup-
porting the link between start-up costs and employment.
1 The economy
The economy consists of a continuum of infinitely-lived individuals in the unit
interval. Each individual can be either a worker or a manager. Managers
establish a firm that they own, create jobs and recruit workers. A manager
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can manage many jobs at the same time but a worker can only occupy one
job at a time. A firm is a collection of jobs headed by a single manager.4
All agents have linear utility functions and capital markets are perfect
and characterized by a safe interest rate r. Agents decide to become work-
ers or managers by maximizing utility under rational expectations over their
horizon. They are identical in all respects except for their managerial ability,
or “entrepreneurship.” Managerial ability is summarized in a function that
gives the cost of managing jobs. The cost of managing α jobs is given by
xg(α), with x ∈ [x0,∞) and g(α) increasing and convex. The parameter x is
specific to each individual and has known distribution F (x) over the popula-
tion. Good managers have low x, poor managers have a high x. Managerial
ability influences only the cost of management. It does not influence the
productivity of the worker or manager.
When a firm is first created, the manager posts α job vacancies and
workers arrive according to the parameters of a matching technology. The
number α is chosen optimally to maximize profit, so in general it will depend
on x. Because a firm is owned and headed by a single manager, we can identify
firms with managers and with the parameter x. We can therefore refer to
firm x or manager x.When the firm is mature some of its α(x) jobs will be
occupied and some vacant. We refer to the occupied jobs as employment
in firm x, and denote it by n(x). Posted vacancies in firm x are then given
by α(x) − n(x) ≥ 0. The cost of managing a job is the same irrespective of
whether it is vacant or filled, an assumption that can easily be relaxed.
Each occupied job produces a constant flow of output y and continues
producing this output until the worker leaves. In the simple version of the
model in this paper I assume that there are no productivity shocks and the
only reason for the interruption of production is an exogenous process that
separates workers from jobs. The separation process could be interpreted
as exogenous death and replacement of the worker or manager, with only
trivial modifications to the argument. I simplify the exposition by assuming
that there is no death and replacement, all agents have infinite horizons but
they are separated at constant Poisson rate λ. After separation the job is
re-advertised as a vacancy and the worker becomes unemployed to search
4Although I do not refer explicitly to self employment, the model can easily be extended
to deal with it. For example, a self employed individual can be interpreted as a firm that
yields some output with no workers besides the manager. I simplify the exposition by
assuming that although managers are never unemployed, the firm cannot yield output
without workers.
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for another job. Unemployed workers enjoy income flow b but job vacancies
produce and cost nothing (with the exception of their management cost).
The allocation of jobs to workers is modelled as in the simplest case
analyzed in Pissarides (2000, chapter 1), with an important modification
necessitated by the introduction of managers. Suppose at some time t en-
trepreneurs have created and are managing a total of n + v jobs, with n of
them occupied by workers and v of them vacant. There are n + u workers
in this market, one in each occupied job and u unemployed. The v vacant
jobs and u unemployed workers engage in a process of search and matching
governed by an aggregate matching function with constant returns to scale.
It is shown in Pissarides (2000, chapter 1) that under these assumptions the
arrival process can be summarized by a single parameter, the tightness of
the market θ ≡ v/u, such that: workers arrive to jobs according to a Poisson
rate q(θ), which has elasticity in the interval (−1, 0), and jobs arrive to un-
employed workers according to a related Poisson rate θq(θ), with elasticity
in the interval (0, 1) and with
limθ→∞ q(θ) = limθ→0 θq(θ) = 0 (1)
limθ→0 q(θ) = limθ→∞ θq(θ) =∞ (2)
2 Decentralized search equilibrium
There are several ways in which a decentralized search equilibrium can be
specified and solved. The key properties of a search equilibrium, which were
noted by Phelps in his two seminal contributions in search theory (Phelps
et al., 1970, Phelps 1972), are first, that search frictions introduce monopoly
rents, and second, in the decentralized solution the dependence of the aggre-
gate arrival rates on individual actions are ignored. The first implies that we
need a monopoly solution to wage determination and the second that there
are congestion externalities that are likely to be ignored in the individual op-
timization problems. In this paper I will study the decentralized equilibrium
when wages split the monopoly rents from each job between the worker and
the manager according to the arbitrary constant β ∈ (0, 1), with β denoting
the share of the worker in each job. This solution to wage determination is
diﬀerent from the “wage posting” solution adopted by Phelps in his seminal
contributions (and more recently by Burdett and Mortensen (1998), among
others). It can be derived from the solution to the static Nash bargain, when
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the bargain takes place between isolated pairs of managers and workers, but
I will not explore its foundations here and treat β as an arbitrary constant.
2.1 Managers and workers
If an individual decides to become a worker, she can search for a job oﬀered
by a manager. If she becomes an entrepreneur, she can create α jobs and
post vacancies waiting for workers to arrive. Individuals decide whether to
become managers or workers by maximizing income over an infinite horizon,
with constant discount rate r.
Let U be the present discounted value of income of the searching worker
and V the expected PDV of profit income from a vacant job. Both U and
V are independent of the individual’s managerial ability x. The cost of man-
aging α jobs is xg(α), irrespective of whether they are occupied or vacant.
Therefore, with infinite horizon, in the steady state the total management
cost paid by an x individual who creates α jobs is xg(α)/r. By creating one
more job a manager can enjoy additional income over the infinite horizon
of V, for an additional lifetime management cost of xg0(α)/r. Therefore, the
optimal α satisfies
xg0(α(x)) = rV. (3)
The marginal cost of managing a job is equal to the “permanent income”
generated by a new job vacancy, the marginal revenue from the posting of
one more job vacancy. It is constant across firms, because V is independent of
the manager’s ability. This immediately gives the distribution of jobs across
managers in terms of the marginal costs of management and the distribution
of abilities. If two managers have ability x and x0 respectively, and create
α and α0 jobs respectively, they satisfy, xg0(α) = x0g0(α0). For example, if
g(α) = γα2/2, α0 = αx/x0.
If an x individual becomes an entrepreneur and creates α(x) jobs, her
initial net expected payoﬀ is α(x)V − xg(α(x))/r. If she becomes a worker,
her initial payoﬀ is U. Therefore, individuals whose x satisfies the following
inequality become entrepreneurs:
max
α
{αV − xg(α)/r} ≥ U. (4)
As expected, the maximization condition is (3). Agents who become entre-
preneurs will post the maximum number of jobs immediately.
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Individuals who have been entrepreneurs for a while will have some jobs
filled and some vacant. Because of the obvious property that filled jobs do
not have lower expected payoﬀs than vacant jobs, no agent who satisfies in-
equality (4) will drop out of entrepreneurship and become a worker after some
jobs are filled. Similarly, individuals who do not satisfy (4), and are therefore
workers, will eventually find a job. Because the expected returns from em-
ployment are at least as high as the expected returns from unemployment,
if (4) is not satisfied for an unemployed worker it will not be satisfied for an
employed worker. Therefore, (4) is a general condition for the allocation of
agents between entrepreneurship and worker status.
V and U are both independent of x by assumption, so (4) satisfies the
reservation property: there is a reservation managerial ability R, such that
an x individual becomes an entrepreneur if x ≤ R, otherwise she becomes a
worker. The reservation ability satisfies
R =
α(R)rV − rU
g(α(R))
(5)
with Rg0(α(R)) = rV. Conditions (4) and (5) state the obvious property that
the income flow from the α jobs, α(x)rV, has to cover their management cost
and the manager’s loss of the expected returns from search.
2.2 Expected payoﬀs
The expected payoﬀs to workers and job owners are derived as in conventional
search models. The PDV of income of a posted vacancy, V, satisfies
rV = q(θ)(J − V ), (6)
where J are the expected returns from an occupied job, which satisfy
rJ = y − w − λ(J − V ). (7)
The job switches between employment and vacancy according to the transi-
tion rates q(θ) and λ. When it is vacant it produces and costs nothing but
when it is filled it produces y, yielding net income y − w to the manager,
with w going to the worker. Management costs can be ignored in these
calculations because they are the same for both vacancies and filled jobs.
The unemployed worker’s PDV of income, U, satisfies
rU = b+ θq(θ)(W − U), (8)
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where W are the expected returns from holding a job, and satisfy
rW = w − λ(W − U). (9)
The worker moves from unemployment to employment and back at rates
θq(θ) and λ respectively, with income in unemployment given by b and in
employment by w.
Wages share the surplus from the job match according to the fixed para-
meter β ∈ (0, 1). Total surplus is given by J −V +W −U, with J −V going
to the owner of the job and W − U going to the worker. Therefore wages
solve
(1− β)(W − U) = β(J − V ). (10)
From (8), (10) and (6), we obtain
rU = b+
βθ
1− β rV. (11)
Adding up the value equations (6)-(9) and making use of the sharing rule
(10) to substitute out W − U and J − V in terms of the surplus from the
job, we obtain the following expression for the surplus:
J − V +W − U = y − b
(1− β)q(θ) + r + λ+ βθq(θ) . (12)
(6), (10) and (12) yield
rV =
(1− β)q(θ)(y − b)
(1− β)q(θ) + r + λ + βθq(θ) . (13)
We can therefore write V = V (θ), with V 0(θ) < 0. This is an important
property: intuitively, the larger the number of jobs posted by all firms for each
unemployed worker, the less the expected profit of each firm from posting
one more vacancy. The reason for this result is the congestion externality
caused by the posting of vacancies, because production is not characterized by
diminishing returns to the number of jobs. The implications for equilibrium,
however, are similar. At the aggregate level, the marginal profit from one
more job falls as the number of jobs increases.
Given now (13), (11) implies that U = U(θ) with U 0(θ) > 0. Workers
are made better oﬀ when more jobs are posted for each unemployed worker.
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Once again, the reason for this result is the search externality associated with
these models.
Note finally that although we cannot say in general whether the PDV of
income is higher or lower for a worker or her manager, it follows immediately
from the value equations that for as long as y > b, a necessary condition for
a nontrivial equilibrium, J ≥ V andW ≥ U ; i.e. both managers and workers
are better oﬀ when they are producing than when they are searching. These
inequalities confirm that if the career choice condition (4) is satisfied for
unemployed agents then it is certainly satisfied for employed ones.
2.3 Equilibrium
An equilibrium is defined as a reservation managerial ability R, a market
tightness θ, and distributions of jobs, employment and wages (α(x), n(x), w(x))
across managers, given the distribution of abilities F (x). The equilibrium
satisfies the value equations (6)-(9), the wage sharing rule, (10), the career
choice rule (4), the marginal job entry rule, (3), and the equation for the
evolution of employment in each firm,
n˙(x) = (α(x)− n(x))θq(θ)− λn(x). (14)
I illustrate the solution with the help of a diagram.
The results in (11) and (13) imply that the equilibrium R, which satisfies
(5), is a monotonically decreasing function of aggregate tightness, θ. When
tightness is higher, managers find it more diﬃcult to recruit workers, so fewer
individuals decide to start their own companies and more become workers.
This relationship is shown in (R, θ) space as a downward-sloping curve labeled
“entrepreneurship” (see figure 1). The limits to this curve are derived as
follows.
If θ = 0, (13) and (1) and (2) imply rV = y− b and (11) implies rU = b.
Therefore, from (5) we derive Rg(α(R) = α(R)(y−b)−b, where Rg0(α(R)) =
y−b. This gives the maximum feasible value of R. It also follows from (4) that
for any choice of α(x), in a feasible equilibrium α(x)V (θ) ≥ U(θ)+xg(α(x)) >
0. Define therefore θ˜ by V (θ˜) = 0 and θ0 by α(x0)V (θ0) = U(θ0)+x0g(α(x0)),
where x0 is the ability of the best manager. Equilibrium is non-trivial only
for values of θ that satisfy θ ≤ θ0 < θ˜. θ˜ is the equilibrium value of tightness
in models that derive the demand for labor from a zero-profit condition on
the value of a new vacancy (as in Pissarides, 2000; of course, if there are
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management costs in these models, the zero-profit condition would have to
take them into account). θ0 is the tightness level at which finding a new
worker is so diﬃcult, that only the most able manager in the market will
choose to become an employer. See figure 1.
In order to derive a second equilibrium relationship between θ and R, con-
sider the definition of θ as the ratio of aggregate vacancies to unemployment.
With each firm owner creating α(x) jobs, aggregate vacancies for any aggre-
gate employment level n measure
R R
x0
α(x)dF (x) − n. With all agents with
managerial ability at least as good as R becoming managers, unemployment
is 1 − F (R) − n. 1 − F (R) is the total numbers of workers in the economy
and n is their employment level. Hence
θ =
R R
x0
α(x)dF (x)− n
1− F (R)− n . (15)
The evolution of aggregate employment is given by aggregating over x in
(14). In the steady state employment in each firm satisfies
n(x) =
q(θ)
q(θ) + λ
α(x). (16)
Aggregating over x we obtain one expression for aggregate employment in
the steady state:
n =
q(θ)
q(θ) + λ
Z R
x0
α(x)dF (x). (17)
A second expression is derived by focusing on worker flows. The flow of
unemployed workers into employment is θq(θ)(1 − F (R) − n) and the flow
of employed workers into unemployment is λn. Equating the two flows gives
steady state employment
n =
θq(θ)
θq(θ) + λ
(1− F (R)). (18)
Substitution from (18) and (17) into (15) yields
θq(θ) + θλ
θq(θ) + λ
=
R R
x0
α(x)dF (x)
1− F (R) . (19)
Now, from (3) and (13) each α(x) is a function of x and V (θ), with
∂α(x)
∂θ
=
∂α(x)
∂V
∂V
∂θ
< 0 ∀x. (20)
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Total diﬀerentiation of (19) therefore gives dθ/dR > 0 : at higher R there
are more managers and fewer workers, so more jobs are created and posted
for each job seeker. We refer to this curve in (R, θ) space as job creation. As
R→ x0, θ → 0, giving the shape of the curve shown in figure 1.
Equilibrium is now straightforward to obtain. The equilibrium R and θ
are unique and shown by the intersection of the two curves in figure 1. With
knowledge of R and θ, V and U can be obtained from (11) and (13), and (3)
then gives α(x) for each firm x.With knowledge of α(x), employment in each
firm is obtained from (16). To obtain wages, note that the value equation
(7) can be rearranged to yield
J − V = y − w − rV
r + λ
(21)
and the one for W, (9), yields
W − U = w − rU
r + λ
. (22)
Substitution into the sharing rule (10) gives
w = (1− β)rU + β(y − rV ), (23)
which can be solved for wages. It is noteworthy that wages are common
across all jobs and managers: better managers do not pay more, despite the
decentralized sharing rule and the frictions that do not eliminate monopoly
rents.
3 The role of start-up costs
In the equilibrium derived in the preceding section agents could become man-
agers and set up a firm without any fixed costs or waiting time. Evidence,
however, points to large start-up costs, partly in the form of legal procedures
that have to be satisfied before a business firm can open its doors, partly in
terms of a waiting time for the permit to arrive and partly in the form a fee
that has to be paid to the authorities. Our framework is ideally suited to
the introduction of costs of this kind. Although in the simple version of the
model that I described here all costs have similar impact on the equilibrium
allocation of agents and job creation, I will consider separately the role of
three distinct costs.
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First, an agent who decides to become entrepreneur has to start legal
procedures for the creation of her company. Next, a permit giving the li-
cence to start operating comes with some randomness. And finally, when the
permit arrives, the entrepreneur has to pay a fee to the authorities to receive
the registration documents. I assume that permits arrive stochastically, at
rate a > 0. The expected waiting time for a new company is 1/a. This rate
is influenced mainly by policy, although in many countries it is possible to
speed up the procedure by paying “bribes” (see Djankov et al., 2000). During
the waiting time, the entrepreneur has to give up her worker status and pay
some out-of-pocket costs to go through the necessary procedures. I represent
these costs as a flow c ≥ 0, paid until the permit arrives. When the permit
arrives, a fee s ≥ 0 is paid and the company starts operation.
A new company headed by an individual of ability x starts operations with
α(x) posted vacancies, which satisfy the marginal condition (3). The value of
the firm at start-up is α(x)V (θ)−xg(α(x)), which I denote for simplicity by
S(x, θ), Sx, Sθ < 0. The introduction of the start-up costs does not alter this
value for given θ and x, so its solution is known from the preceding analysis.
Let the entrepreneur’s optimal PDV of income when the decision is made
to apply for a new company be Q. With discount rate r and the stationary
policy variables a, c, s, this value satisfies the Bellman equation
rQ = −c+ a(S(x, θ)− s−Q). (24)
The entrepreneur pays c per period until a permit arrives, which changes her
state from Q to S, for a fee s. Solving (24) for Q gives
Q(a, c, s, θ; x) =
a
r + a
S(x, θ)− c+ as
r + a
. (25)
Given knowledge of S(x, θ), Q() is immediately obtained from (25) because
r, a, c and s are all parameters.
Equation (25) implies that for given x and θ, the value of applying for a
new firm falls in the costs c and s and rises in the arrival rate of the permit
a (and so falls in the expected waiting time 1/a). An x individual will apply
for a new company if Q(a, c, s, θ;x) ≥ U(θ). Because Q() falls monotonically
in x, a reservation rule similar to the one in (5) is again satisfied. At the
optimal R,
a
r + a
S(R, θ)− c+ as
r + a
= U(θ). (26)
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Equation (26) can be represented in (R, θ) space as a downward-sloping curve
similar to the entrepreneurship curve of figure 1, but now shifts down in the
costs c and s and in the expected delay 1/a. The start-up costs do not in-
fluence any of the other expressions in the derivation of equilibrium, because
workers arrive and wage determination takes place after the company is set
up and the costs paid.
The influence of start-up costs can be derived with the help of figure 2.
They shift the entrepreneurship curve down and so reduce the fraction of the
population who become entrepreneurs. Employment falls for two reasons.
First, because entrepreneurs have higher employment rates than workers,
the shift from managers to workers reduces employment. We refer to this as
the composition eﬀect of start-up costs. Overall employment is given by the
sum of the number of managers and the aggregate employment of workers:
F (R) + n =
λF (R) + θq(θ)
λ+ θq(θ)
. (27)
The composition eﬀect is shown by a lower F (R).
Second, with fewer entrepreneurs, job creation is lower, so fewer workers
find jobs. We refer to this as the job creation eﬀect of start-up costs. It is
shown in (27) by a lower θq(θ).
Start-up costs reduce market tightness and so through (13) increase the
expected profit from a new vacancy. This is an equilibrium response to the
costs: new entrepreneurs have to pay the start-up costs and so need higher
expected profit from new jobs to compensate them. The costs are borne by
workers in the form of higher unemployment, lower wages and lower PDV of
income of both employed and unemployed persons, implied by (11) and (23).
The number of jobs in each existing firm, however, increases, because
of the increase in the expected profit per job, as implied by (3) and (20).
Start-up costs protect the incumbents, who now make more profit per job
and create more jobs. But the market as a whole suﬀers, because the number
of entrepreneurs now falls and there is less aggregate job creation. This is
what Djankov et al. (2000) call the “grabbing-hand” view of regulation.
Following Stigler’s analysis of regulation, they argue that one of the reasons
for regulation is to make entry more diﬃcult and create rents for incumbents.
Their second version of the “grabbing-hand”, what they call the “tollbooth
view” of entry costs, is also satisfied by the model. This is that the reason for
start-up costs is for the politicians to collect revenue, which is represented in
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the model by the two cost variables c and s.5
Our model can also be used to analyze the impact of bribes. It is asserted
by many (see again Djankov et al.) that entrepreneurs can pay bribes to
speed up the arrival of permits for business start ups. Let the bribe be a
payment p, made when the permit arrives (the analysis is similar if it is paid
during the waiting period with no guarantee of a faster arrival). The bribe
speeds up arrival by increasing the arrival rate a : a = a(p), a0(p) > 0. Then
(24) changes to
rQ = max
p
{−c+ a(p)(S(x, θ)− s− p−Q)}. (28)
The optimal bribe increases in the expected payoﬀ S(x, θ) and the recurring
cost c but decreases in the fee s under standard restrictions.
4 Some preliminary evidence
Several factors related to policy have been identified as contributing to coun-
try diﬀerences in employment or unemployment rates. The problem that has
to be confronted when considering the influence of company start-up costs is
how to distinguish the influence of start-up costs from the influence of other
related variables, given that a country that has a lot of regulation in company
start-ups is also likely to have a lot of regulation elsewhere. My modest ob-
jective in this section is to look at some partial correlations between start-up
costs and employment performance and at the relation between start-up costs
and another much-researched regulation candidate, employment protection
legislation.
In Table 1 I report two sources of data for start-up costs for major coun-
tries of the OECD. The first two columns report data gathered by Logotech
and reported by Fonseca et al. (2001). Column (1) gives the number of pro-
cedures needed to register a company. A procedure is anything that has to
be done in an oﬃce outside the company’s premises, such as filling-in a form
and submitting it for obtaining a VAT number. Column (2) gives the aver-
age number of weeks that lapse between the first application for a start-up
and the first legal trading day. Column 3 combines these series into a single
5Their first, Pigovian view, that regulation gives consumers a “helping hand” by ensur-
ing that only good entrepreneurs start up is not in the model. They do not find evidence
for it.
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index. In order to compile the index, we first calculate how many procedures
are on average completed within a week in the sample as a whole. We then
divide the actual number of procedures that a country requires by the aver-
age and obtain a series that has the dimension of weeks, but which is a linear
transformation of the number of procedures. Our index is the average of the
actual number of weeks needed and the constructed series.
Columns 4-6 report data compiled by Djankov et al. (2000). Again, the
first two columns report the number of procedures and the expected waiting
time, in business days. Column 6 gives the expected cost as a percent of
GDP per capita in 1997.
Although there are diﬀerences between the two data sources, the cor-
relations is high. Table 2 reports correlation coeﬃcients. The correlation
between the two series for procedures is 0.64, which is almost identical to
the correlation between the two series for waiting times (not reported in the
Table). The Table also reports the correlations between the start-up series
and the OECD’s index for employment protection legislation, which is rep-
resentative of labor-market regulation. The correlation is positive and over
0.70 with all measures of start-up costs, indicating that countries with a lot
of regulation of company start-ups also have a lot of labor regulation.
The correlations between employment-to-population ratios and the mea-
sures for start-up costs are better than the respective correlations with unem-
ployment. The series compiled by Fonseca et al. (2001) give better correla-
tions, which are in turn better than the correlations between employment and
employment protection. Figure 3 shows the correlation between the index
for start-up costs and the employment-to-population ratio (which is about
the same as the one with the number of procedures). The correlation is bet-
ter than the one between employment and employment protection, shown
in figure 4 (0.80 versus 0.60). Figures 5 and 6 show the partial correlations
between unemployment and the respective measures of regulation. Again,
although the fit is not as good as for employment, it is better with our index
of start-up costs than with employment protection legislation.
Despite the correlation between start-up costs and employment protec-
tion, the partial correlations give encouraging results about the likely impor-
tance of start-up costs in the explanation of OECD employment.6
6With only 17 observations not much more can be said at this stage. However, a simple
regression of employment rates on the start-up index (or the number of procedures) and
employment protection gives a significant result for start-up costs (t-statistic -3.25) but not
for EPL (t-statistic -0.02), with an R2 of 0.64. If the dependent variable is unemployment,
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5 Conclusions
The motivation for this paper is very much that in Edmund Phelps’ book
Structural Slumps: the factors that can explain the diﬀerences in labor mar-
ket performance across the OECD are “structural,” and should be sought
in the institutional structures of the countries. The factor discussed in this
paper is one neglected by previous studies, the regulatory framework for the
establishment of new companies. I have shown how the costs that govern-
ments impose on new entrepreneurs can give rise to diﬀerences in equilibrium
employment rates, within a fairly standard model of equilibrium search with
career choice. A preliminary examination of the data shows that there are
large diﬀerences across the OECD in company start-up costs and that these
costs are strongly correlated with employment performance. Of course, al-
though lower costs of entering an activity in the labor market are obviously
better than higher costs, this paper has nothing to say about the welfare
aspects of regulation in business start-ups. Regulation is exogenous in the
model and its implications for the labor market are the trivial ones of im-
posing some entry costs on new entrepreneurs. My purpose was to examine
the extent to which the diﬀerent entry costs imposed by governments across
essentially similar economies have implications for the observed diﬀerences in
labor market performance. Fewer costs are not necessarily better than more
costs along all their dimensions.
The next step in this research is a more general model of employment de-
termination that can distinguish between the regulation of entry and other
types of regulations. I have made a beginning in this paper by looking at
labor regulation, in the form of employment protection legislation. Although
the correlation between start-up costs and employment protection measures
is positive and high, start-up costs appear to be better correlated with em-
ployment performance than is employment protection. The welfare aspects
of diﬀerent aspects of regulation and start-up costs also need to be examined
before policy recommendations can be made.
the t-statistic on start-up costs is 2.75 and on employment protection -0.46, withR2 = 0.49.
It is intended to test formally the propositions of this paper in future work.
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Table 1 
Company Start-Up Costs, 1997-8 
 
 
 
 
Country Procedures
(1) 
Weeks
(2) 
Index
(3) 
Procedures
(4) 
Days 
(5) 
Cost 
(6) 
Australia 6.5 1 2.47 3 3 0.021 
Austria 10 8 7.03 12 154 0.454 
Belgium 7 6 5.12 8 42 0.010 
Denmark 2 1 1.11 5 21 0.014 
Finland 7 6 5.12 4 32 0.012 
France 16 6 7.85 16 66 0.197 
Germany 10 16 11.03 7 90 0.085 
Greece 28 6.5 11.73 13 53 0.480 
Ireland 15 3 6.04 4 25 0.114 
Italy 25 10 12.57 11 121 0.247 
Japan 14 3 5.74 11 50 0.114 
Luxembourg 5 2 2.51    
Netherlands 9 12 8.73 8 68 0.190 
Portugal 10 8 7.03 12 99 0.313 
Spain 17 23.5 16.90 11 83 0.127 
Sweden 7 3 3.62 4 17 0.025 
United Kingdom 4 1 1.71 7 11 0.006 
United States 3.5 1.5 1.81 4 7 0.010 
 
  
Notes: Columns (1) and (4) give the number of procedures that a new company has to go 
through before starting operations. Column (1) is from Fonseca et al (2001) and column (4) 
from Djankov et al (2000). Columns (2) and (5) give the average length of time, in weeks and 
business days respectively, needed to complete these procedures. Sources as above. Column 
(3) combines the first two measures according to the formula (no. of weeks + no. of 
procedures/average procedures per week)/2. The average is computed as the ratio of the sum 
of procedures to the sum of weeks, so the index has the sample mean of weeks. Column (6) 
gives the expected financial cost as a percent of GDP per capita in 1997. Source, Djankov et 
al (2000).  
.  
 
Table 2 
 
Correlations 
 
 
 Employment Unemployment Procedures1 Procedures2 Index
Unemployment -0.82     
Procedures1 -0.81 0.56    
Procedures2 -0.49 0.28 0.64   
Index -0.80 0.70 0.77 0.59  
EPL -0.60 0.47 0.70 0.76 0.75 
 
Notes: Employment is defined as the ratio of employment to population of working age in 1998, 
Unemployment is the standardized unemployment rate in 1998, Procedures1 is the series shown 
in column (1) of Table 1, Procedures2 is shown in column (4) of Table 1, Index is the index of 
start-up costs shown in column (6) of Table 1 and EPL is the OECD’s index of employment 
protection legislation in the late 1990s. 
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